We propose a model of backward induction with a decision maker who has limited ability to identify the optimal choice path and chooses with randomness. Our axioms yield a two-parameter representation of the decision maker's behavior; one characterizes her attitude towards complexity; i.e., her willingness to choose more complicated continuations over simpler ones, the other her error-proneness. We analyze comparative measures of complexity aversion and error-proneness. When complexity aversion and error-proneness disappear, our model becomes fully rational backward induction.
Introduction
Backward induction has been used to predict decision makers'behavior in dynamic economic situations. In a dynamic situation, fully rational backward induction begins with identifying the optimal choice for the last stage, and then rollbacks to the …rst. The solution is taken as a prediction of how decision makers behave.
Empirical and experimental evidence has suggested that such predictions are often rather di¤erent from how people actually behave, even in simple dynamic problems. 1 The reason is simple. Think of a decision maker who needs to make a sequence of choices in a dynamic
problem. Since the current-stage choice determines the continuation problems, the decision maker needs to look forward. By using the solution derived from fully rational backward induction to predict such a decision maker's behavior, we implicitly assume that when the decision maker looks forward, she is able to identify the optimal choice path, and also able to follow the path deterministically. However, research often …nds that (i) forward looking is imperfect (e.g., Camerer, et al. (1993) ), and (ii) decision makers'choices appear to contain randomness from our point of view (e.g., Palfrey (1995, 1998) ). Part (i) is selfevident. As for part (ii), in practice, a decision maker may employ a heuristic or deterministic rule to make choices. However, it is unlikely for us, the modelers, to know which heuristic or rule has been employed. Hence, the decision maker's choices appear random.
Motivated by these observations, we formulate a model of a decision maker who cannot identify the optimal choice path and chooses with randomness. Our goal is not to analyze speci…c heuristics that work only for a particular class of problems, nor to study the decision maker's actual reasoning process. 2 Rather, we present a framework for analyzing how the decision maker's choices may vary with the presentation of the choice problem; that is, how changes further down a decision tree a¤ect the decision maker's choice at the current stage.
In the resulting model, our decision maker's choice behavior di¤ers from that of a fully rational one in two ways. Facing a decision tree, a decision maker makes a series of choices to reach an outcome. 3 A fully rational decision maker identi…es each tree with its best subtree (and hence identi…es the optimal choice path), and chooses the best subtree with certainty.
Our decision maker behaves as if (i) she evaluates a decision tree by employing a general aggregator to aggregate all the subtree values, and (ii) she makes random mistakes when choosing among subtrees. The …rst departure enables us to identify a comparative measure of complexity aversion; that is, the extent to which the decision maker avoids complex subtrees.
The second departure enables us to identify a comparative measure of error-proneness; that is, the likelihood that the decision maker makes mistakes.
Our model is derived from simple axioms on the decision maker's choices. The primitive is a random choice rule that describes how the decision maker chooses among the available subtrees when facing a decision tree. Decision trees are de…ned recursively: Depth-1 decision trees are …nite sets of outcomes, depth-2 decision trees are …nite sets consisting of outcomes and depth-1 decision trees, and so on. By de…nition, a generic decision tree a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g is a set of subtrees. Implicitly, we assume that the modeler can observe the decision tree and the decision maker's behavior in a variety of decision trees repeatedly.
We present axioms that relate how the decision maker chooses in some decision tree a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g to how she would have chosen in each subtree a 1 ; : : : ; a n . If a decision maker chooses a more often from fa; d 1 ; : : : ; d n g than b from fb; d 1 ; : : : ; d n g for all d 1 ; : : : ; d n ;
that is, if P (fag; fa; d 1 ; : : : ; d n g) P (fbg; fb; d 1 ; : : : ; d n g) for all d 1 ; : : : ; d n , we say that the decision maker prefers a to b (see Figure 1 ). This terminology is appropriate: an error-prone decision maker cannot reveal her preference deterministically but can reveal it statistically. Our …rst axiom, Independence, allows us to identify a complete preference relation from the decision maker's error-prone choices. Stochastic Set Betweenness implies that the decision maker chooses fwing over d more often in the …rst decision tree than fwin; draw; loseg over d in the second decision tree, which is in turn chosen more often than fdraw; loseg over d in the last decision tree.
Finally, Preference for Accentuating Swaps implies that if the decision maker prefers an outcome x to y, then she also prefers the depth-2 decision tree a = ffx; w 1 ; : : : ; w m g; fy; z 1 ; : : : ; z n gg to b = ffy; w 1 ; : : : ; w m g; fx; z 1 ; : : : ; z n gg, as long as 0 m n. To see what this means, note that in the decision tree b, the outcome y is more visible than x, because y is presented at a smaller subtree fy; w 1 ; : : : ; w m g, and x is presented at a larger subtree fx; z 1 ; : : : ; z n g.
By swapping x for y, we transform b into a. Such a swap renders the better outcome x more visible, while the original tree b emphasizes the inferior outcome y. Accentuating the better outcome in this fashion improves the original tree and hence weakly increases the probability that the decision maker chooses the tree. Note that this axiom only applies to depth-2 trees.
See Figure 3 for a concrete example. The left-hand-side decision tree is swapped into the right-hand-side one. After the swap, Win becomes more salient and Draw becomes less so. Thus the decision maker chooses the right-hand-side decision tree with higher probability.
Theorem 1 establishes that these four axioms, together with other technical conditions, yield the following representation of the random choice rule: there exists a value function V and > 0 such that
for any decision tree a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g. Thus, the random choice rule P is a Luce rule (see Luce (1959) ). For a …xed , subtrees with higher Luce values are chosen more often.
Moreover, there is a function f such that V satis…es
for all a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g. The aggregator (the right-hand side of (1)) relates tree a's value to its subtree values. Intuitively, the aggregator is a general notion of average, while in fully rational backward induction, the aggregator is the maximum function (V (a) = max V (a j )).
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Depending on f , our aggregator ranges from the maximum to the minimum. We call a random choice rule that has the representation described above a Boundedly-Rational BackwardInduction Rule (BBR). When a decision maker's behavior follows a BBR, she acts as if she assigns an average of the subtree values to evaluate a tree. Then, when she actually chooses, sometimes she mistakenly chooses low-value subtrees. The propensity of making mistakes depends on .
The two parameters and f quantify the extent to which the decision maker's behavior di¤ers from that of a fully rational decision maker. To see this, …rst consider the choice between an outcome and a decision tree. Outcomes are the simplest choice objects in our setting. For two decision makers, if decision maker 2 always chooses the outcome over tree more often than decision maker 1 who faces the same problem, then decision maker 2 is said to be more complexity-averse than decision maker 1. In Theorem 2, we show that this holds if and only if f 2 is a concave transformation of f 1 . Therefore, the concavity of f describes the decision maker's attitude toward complexity. Next, consider two decision makers who have the same value function and f . Decision maker 1 is characterized by a BBR with parameters 1 and decision maker 2 with 2 1 . Note that the two decision makers share the same ranking of decision trees. Given any decision tree fa; bg, decision maker 1 chooses a more often than b if and only if 2 chooses a more often than b. However, since 2 1 , decision maker 2 makes more mistakes; that is, she always chooses the preferred tree less often.
Theorem 3 extends this observation to develop a comparative measure of error-proneness.
We take limits of the comparative measure of complexity aversion and error-proneness to …nd BBR's limiting cases. Fully rational backward induction is a limiting case where both complexity aversion and error-proneness disappear. We present another useful limiting case in which the decision maker chooses deterministically; that is, she never makes a mistake given her valuation of trees. However, she remains complexity-averse; that is, she may choose a simpler subtree over a complex one even though had she chosen the complex one, she could have ended up with better outcomes.
Lastly, we apply the BBR to discuss some simple examples. In particular, we discuss (i) when adding a subtree to a node of a decision tree increases the value of the tree, even though the decision tree seems to become more complex, (ii) the e¤ectiveness of the presentation strategy that singles out an outcome from other outcomes, and (iii) the e¤ectiveness of the presentation strategy that repeats an outcome in multiple subtrees of a decision tree.
Related Literature
Our work belongs to the research of bounded rationality and behavioral economics that aims at developing better models to describe how people choose in complex dynamic situations.
Among others, Jéhiel (1995) examines the implication of limited foresight in a special class of repeated games. In his model, the agents can only look forward j steps. Jéhiel equips the agents with a speci…c heuristic, the average payo¤ from the j steps, to evaluate the continuation problems beyond the j th step. The heuristic is very reasonable for the games he studies. Gabaix and Laibson (2005) study a reasoning procedure where the decision maker evaluates situations as if they end right away. Based on this heuristic, the procedure determines the optimal number of steps that the decision maker looks forward endogenously.
Although analyzing speci…c heuristics is important, our work does not focus on a speci…c heuristic. There are many reasonable heuristics, and it is di¢ cult to know or to test which heuristic is used when we estimate or predict the decision maker's behavior. Therefore, we take a di¤erent approach. From simple dynamic-choice examples that illustrate plausible deviations from fully rational backward induction, we abstract testable axioms. Then, we characterize the unique model that is equivalent to those axioms. As a byproduct, unlike most models in the previous literature, our model is fully testable and identi…able.
In the decision theory literature, Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) Fudenberg and Strzalecki are the …rst to axiomatically extend the Luce rule to a dynamic setting, and the …rst to axiomatically introduce choice aversion. One of their main …ndings is that choice aversion is associated with a preference for delaying decisions. Our work has a di¤erent goal. We focus on relaxing backward induction. Our axiom 5 also rules out the type of preference for delay that Fudenberg and Strzalecki consider.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The axioms, the representation, and our main theorem are presented in Section 2. Section 3 de…nes and characterizes comparative complexity aversion and error-proneness. Section 4 provides simple application examples.
Section 5 concludes.
Model
In our model, a decision maker makes a series of choices to reach an outcome. The left-hand-side decision tree is a depth-1 decision tree fx; yg 2 D 1 . The righthand-side decision tree is a depth-2 decision tree fx; fy; zgg 2 D 2 . In both trees, x; y; z are outcomes.
Confronting a decision tree b 2 D, the decision maker chooses among b's subtrees with randomness. Let L be the set of …nite-support probability measures on D endowed with the topology of weak convergence. The probability measure P (b) 2 L describes the probability of choosing b's subtrees. With some abuse of notation, we use P (a; b) instead of P (b)(a) to denote the probability that P (b) assigns to the set of subtrees a 2 D; that is, the probability that any subtree in a is chosen when the decision tree is b. We call the function P : D ! L a random choice rule (RCR) if P (a; a) = 1 for all a 2 D.
We have in mind a decision maker with limited ability to identify the optimal choice path of a decision tree and may choose with randomness. The …rst axiom we consider is from Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014). It implies that if the subtrees a are chosen over c more often than b over c, then a should be chosen over d more often than b over d as well.
When we say optimal choice path, implicitly we mean that the decision maker has some true objective. This axiom allows us to identify that true objective consistently, even though the decision maker's behavior is suboptimal. The decision maker may in fact prefer subtree a to b, but she cannot reveal her preference deterministically. However, if we observe that the decision maker always chooses a subtree a over subtrees d more often than a subtree b over d for all d that does not contain a; b, then the decision maker reveals statistically that she prefers a to b.
De…nition 1 For any a; b 2 D, we say that the decision maker prefers a to b (and write
For simplicity, several axioms below are stated in terms of the uncovered preference.
They can be stated in terms of the RCR as well.
To focus on analyzing the decision maker's suboptimal choice behavior, we restrict our attention to the case where her objective does not change over time. 5 Thus, we consider the following simple monotonicity assumption. It states that replacing a subtree with a better one makes the decision tree itself better (see Figure 5 ). 5 For research that focuses on changing objective, see Strotz (1955) , and Laibson (1997) for examples.
Axiom 2 (Dominance) For a = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g, a 0 = fa 0 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g, a 1 a . A fully rational decision maker is indi¤erent between a and a 0 since they have the same best subtree a 2 . In contrast, Dominance implies that a a 0 ; that is, our decision maker has some awareness of her own suboptimal behavior, and more often avoids decision trees with inferior subtrees. The two axioms below encapsulate our model of complexity-averse and error-prone decision making. The …rst, Stochastic Set Betweenness, considers two decision trees a and b that have no subtree in common. For example, suppose a is fwing, b is fdraw; loseg and the decision maker reveals statistically that she prefers fwing over fdraw; loseg. Stochastic Set Betweenness requires that fwing is chosen more often than fwin; draw; loseg, which in turn is chosen more often than fdraw; loseg (see Figure 6 ).
When a b, a fully rational decision maker should be indi¤erent between a and a [ b since they both contain the same best subtree from a. Stochastic Set Betweenness allows the decision maker to strictly prefer a over a [ b, re ‡ecting her aversion to more complex In the literature, Bolker (1966) is the …rst to use this type of condition, through which he derives a generalization of expected value. 6 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a related axiom to model temptation and self-control. Our axiom is weaker than the Gul-Pesendorfer version since we require that a and b have empty intersection. To see why this is important, assume that a = fwin; loseg; b = fwin; lose g, where lose and lose are two similar unattractive outcomes. If the decision maker struggles with complex decision trees, then it may well be that fwin; lose; lose g is worse than both fwin; loseg and fwin; lose g. Therefore, the Gul-Pesendorfer version of set betweenness is violated.
The next axiom is built upon a simple idea: when a depth-1 tree contains fewer outcomes, each of its outcomes commands more attention. To see what attention has to do with choice, let us …rst introduce a notion of a "swap."Let j j denote the cardinality of a set.
De…nition 2 For a = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g 2 D 2 such that x 2 a 1 na 2 , y 2 a 2 na 1 , and ja 1 j ja 2 j, a swap of x for y is 6 We thank Larry Epstein for referring this paper to us.
Note that the de…nition requires that a 2 D 2 is a depth-2 tree, which also implies that x; y are outcomes. In the de…nition, the outcome x originally belongs to a larger subtree (a 1 ) than the one (a 2 ) containing y. We assume that the outcomes from a smaller tree command more attention. Therefore, the swap of x for y accentuates x and masks y. If x is preferred to y, we call this swap an accentuating swap to emphasize the fact that the better subtree x is now more visible. When we write x y (a) to denote the swap of x for y, implicitly we have a 1 ; a 2 2 d, x 2 a 1 na 2 , y 2 a 2 na 1 , and ja 1 j ja 2 j. To understand Preference for Accentuating Swaps, consider a depth-2 decision tree a = fa 1 ; a 2 g where a 1 = flose; wing, a 2 = fdrawg. For a fully rational decision maker, it does not matter which outcome is presented at which part of the tree; that is, she is indi¤erent between a and ffwing; fdraw; losegg. In contrast, when a boundedly rational decision maker looks forward facing the decision tree a, the outcomes in a 1 command less attention than the outcome in a 2 , because there are more outcomes competing for attention in a 1 than in a 2 .
Suppose win is preferred to draw. An accentuating swap of win for draw makes the better outcome win more salient and the worse outcome less (see Figure 8) . Therefore, the swapped decision tree appears to be better, and should be chosen more often than the original tree.
The remaining axioms are technical conditions that help pin down the model. The axiom below states that adding a trivial choice preceding any subtree is irrelevant (see Figure 9 ).
As a result, the decision maker is indi¤erent between a and fag. The left-hand-side decision tree is swapped into the right-hand-side one. After the swap, Win becomes more salient and Draw becomes less so. Thus the decision maker chooses the right-hand-side decision tree with higher probability. The right-hand-side decision tree extends a into fag by adding a trivial choice.
The last axiom is Continuity. The idea behind it is simple. Suppose we already have a value function that assigns values to trees. For any decision tree, we want its value to not change much when its subtree values are slightly perturbed (see Figure 10 ). Of course, we do not have the value function to begin with. To impose this notion of continuity, we need to de…ne some topology for the set of decision trees D. We …rst de…ne the following distance function on the set of subtrees D. For any decision subtrees a; b 2 D, we let (a; b) := jP (fag; fa; bg) P (fbg; fa; bg)j be the distance between a; b. In other words, a and b are close whenever the decision maker considers them to be close substitutes. Next, analogous to the de…nition of the Hausdor¤ distance, we extend the distance function to the set of decision trees D as follows. For any
max max that have the same cardinality. When they do not have the same cardinality, we consider them "far apart." 8 Therefore, our notion of continuity is weaker. To see we consider trees with di¤erent cardinality far apart, suppose we have three indi¤erent outcomes x y z.
Had we not required the second line in (2), we will …nd that (fxg; fy; zg) = 0 according to the …rst line in (2), but clearly P (fxg) and P (fy; zg) are two di¤erent probability measures.
Figure 10: Suppose we already have the value function that evaluates subtrees. The continuity that we need requires that small perturbations to a decision tree's subtree values should have small impact on the decision tree's value.
Axiom 6 (Continuity) The function P is continuous.
In our notion of continuity, the function depends on P , while P is required to be continuous with respect to . This circularity creates no problems. As in standard metric spaces, the metric function is continuous with respect to the topology that it induces. In our case, the distance (c; d) depends on c; d through their subtrees. Thus, like the other axioms,
Continuity builds a connection between decision trees and their subtrees. The function P de…ned on depth-1 decision trees imposes a continuity requirement on P de…ned on depth-2 decision trees, and so on.
Our main theorem identi…es the only model that can satisfy all the axioms above in a rich choice environment.
De…nition 3 An RCR P is a Boundedly-Rational Backward-Induction Rule (BBR) if there exists a value function V : D ! R ++ , a constant > 0, and a strictly increasing continuous function f : R ++ ! R such that for any a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g,
for i = 1; : : : ; n and The choice behavior characterized by a BBR is di¤erent from that by fully rational backward induction in two ways. A fully rational decision maker identi…es each tree with its best subtree, and chooses the best subtree with certainty. A decision maker whose behavior follows a BBR behaves as if she uses a general aggregator to aggregate the subtree values to evaluate a tree, and makes random mistakes when choosing among subtrees. Intuitively, the aggregator is some general notion of average. 9 A rapidly increasing (i.e. convex) f ensures that the aggregator is close to the maximum function, but the aggregator never goes above maximum or below minimum. In contrast, fully rational backward induction always requires V (a) = max V (a j ). Then, our decision maker's error-prone choice behavior follows the widely used model of mistakes, the Luce rule, as in (3). A subtree with higher value is more likely to be chosen. Higher induces fewer mistakes.
We illustrate how this model works through the following example.
Example 1 Consider a = fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g, b = fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg, and c = fa; bg. Note that tree a and b contain the same set of outcomes, but they present them in di¤erent ways. Applying (4) to a, we obtain V (a) = f 1 (
Each outcome x i is assigned an equal weight
f (V (x 3 ))). In other words, since x 1 in b is singled out from x 2 ; x 3 , it commands more attention than x 2 ; x 3 .
As a result, the aggregator assigns a higher weight to it. It is easy to see that if x 1 has the highest value, then V (b) V (a). Lastly, facing decision problem c, the decision maker chooses a with probability
, and b with probability
Note that the aggregator works as if at each stage, the decision maker speads out her attention equally among the available subtrees. As in the decision tree b, x 1 and fx 2 ; x 3 g share the same weight 1=2, and then x 2 and x 3 split the weight 1=2 equally. This observation immediately leads to the following implication. Imagine one situation where an outcome x n is presented deep down the decision tree fx 1 ; fx 2 ; : : : ; fx n ggg, and another situation where x n is presented among many other outcomes in a subtree of the decision tree fx 1 ; fx 2 ; : : : ; x n gg.
Intuitively, in both situations, compared to x 1 , x n seems to be much less important when the decision maker evaluates the entire decision tree. Therefore, if we replace the outcome x n with some other outcome y, the value of the entire decision tree should not change much. : : : ; fx n 1 ; fygggg) = 0 and lim n!1 V (fx 1 ; fx 2 ; : : : ; x n gg) V (fx 1 ; fx 2 ; : : : ; x n 1 ; ygg) = 0.
We omit its proof. To state Theorem 1, we de…ne a rich choice environment.
De…nition 4
and P (fxg; fxg [ a) = q.
Richness in our setting means that for any given probability q and any set of subtrees a,
we can …nd an outcome x such that it is chosen with probability q when put together with a.
Moreover, we can …nd countably many such outcomes, because the de…nition requires that the desired outcome x does not belong to b, for any predetermined b 2 D. Richness is easily satis…ed when the outcome set contains lotteries, as shown in the example below. Our main result below establishes the equivalence between the axioms and the representation. Richness is required in necessity, but not su¢ ciency. To put it another way, when the choice environment is sparse, there may be other choice models that satisfy our axioms.
However, as in Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014), this can be viewed merely as an artifact of the sparse choice environment. Su¢ ciency is routine. As for necessity, …rst, by Theorem 1 in Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014), Independence and richness ensure the existence of V such that the Luce formula (3) holds. We can pick = 1.
10 The more challenging part of the proof is relating V (a) to the V (a i )'s for any a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g so that (4) holds.
The construction of the function f is similar to how one calibrates a vNM utility function from the data on certainty equivalents for 50-50 gambles (see Machina (1987) ). Choose any
To see why this is similar to the calibration of a vNM utility function, think of V (a) and V (b) as monetary prizes x and y, V (fa; bg) as the certainty equivalent of the 50-50 gamble between x and y, and f as the vNM utility function. Then, the equation above is similar to stating that the utility of the certainty equivalent is equal to the expected utility expression on the right-hand side.
Next, consider fa; fa; bgg and set
Similarly, consider fb; fa; bgg and set f (V (fb; fa; bgg))
. We can continue in this fashion and de…ne f on some subset of the reals.
Note that this construction works only because of our axioms. For example, if the representation is to hold, we must have b fa; bg a, because in (4) f is strictly increasing. This is guaranteed by Stochastic Set Betweenness and Dominance. More importantly, consider two decision trees ffa; bg; fc; dgg and ffa; cg; fb; dgg. If P is a BBR, it must be true that ffa; bg; fc; dgg ffa; cg; fb; dgg
because V (ffa; bg; fc; dgg) = V (ffa; cg; fb; dgg) = f
Dominance, richness, and Preference for Accentuating Swaps ensure that (5) Recursively, we de…ne f on a countable subset of R ++ such that f satis…es
Dominance implies that this subset must be dense in V 's image. Hence, together with Continuity, f can be extended to V 's image.
The construction so far only deals with binary decision trees. In the last step, we show that (4) holds not only for binary trees, but also for all …nite decision trees under the same f function. All the axioms are needed to complete this last step.
Proposition 2 below establishes the uniqueness of the BBR representation. In particular, the proposition shows that V is unique up to a positive scalar multiplication, and …xing V and , f is unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation. From here on, for simplicity, when (D 0 ; P ) is rich and P is a BBR, we say that P is a rich BBR.
Proposition 2 Suppose P is a rich BBR. If (V ; ; f ) represents P , then (U ; ; g) also represents P if and only if there exist 1 ; 2 > 0 and 2 R such that
and f (
Note that if V = U and = , then the uniqueness condition of f becomes f (u) = 2 g(u) + . Also note that if both (V ; ; f ) and (U ; ; g) represent P , then V (x) = 1 U (x) implies that V (a) = 1 U (a) .
Complexity Aversion and Error-Proneness
Our model describes a decision maker whose behavior falls short of fully rational backward induction on two dimensions, assigning correct values to trees and choosing the best subtree with certainty. The two types of imperfections allow us to obtain two comparative measures to quantify the extent to which a BBR deviates from fully rational backward induction.
The …rst one, complexity aversion, describes the extent to which the decision maker avoids complex subtrees. The second one, error-proneness, describes the likelihood that the decision maker makes mistakes. We characterize these two comparative measures and present their limiting cases.
Complexity Aversion
Confronting a depth-1 decision tree a 2 D 1 , the decision maker chooses an outcome x 2 a D 0 . An outcome is the least complex choice object in our framework.
Consider two decision makers, labeled 1 and 2, who exhibit the same choice behavior when confronting any depth-1 decision tree. Suppose that compared to decision maker 1, decision maker 2 is always less likely to choose a nondegenerate subtree over an outcome.
Then, we say that decision maker 2 is more complexity-averse than decision maker 1.
It should be noted that we do not attempt to provide a particular notion of complexity.
Rather, we provide a measure to compare di¤erent decision makers'propensity of choosing an outcome over a tree.
To formally de…ne comparative complexity aversion, …rst recall that for an RCR P and a decision tree a 2 D, P (a) 2 L is the probability measure that describes how the decision maker chooses among a. We say that an RCR P 1 and RCR P 2 coincide on depth-1 decision trees if P 1 (a) and P 2 (a) are identical for all a 2 D 1 . Let i be the preference that P i induces.
De…nition 5
The RCR P 2 is more complexity-averse than P 1 if P 1 and P 2 coincide on depth-1 decision trees, and for any x 2 D 0 , a 2 D, a 2 x implies a 1 x.
We say that the function f 2 is more concave than f 1 if f 2 = g f 1 for some strictly increasing and concave function g. The following theorem establishes that the concavity/curvature of f is the comparative measure of a decision maker's complexity aversion.
Theorem 2 Suppose the RCRs P 1 and P 2 are rich BBRs. Then, P 2 is more complexityaverse than P 1 if and only if there exist (V ; ; f 1 ) and (V ; ; f 2 ) that represent P 1 and P 2 respectively such that f 2 is more concave than f 1 .
Theorem 2 implies that the function f in a BBR describes a decision maker's complexity
aversion the same way that a utility function describes a decision maker's risk aversion. A decision tree becomes a closer substitute for its best outcome if f is less concave, and vice versa. The aggregator converges to min V (a i ) as f gets more concave, and it converges to max V (a i ) case as f gets more convex. Note that complexity aversion is not the same as being averse to trees with more subtrees, despite that one of our axioms, Preference for Accentuating Swaps, is closely related to the size of trees.
Some BBR has a constant measure of complexity aversion. These BBRs can potentially be useful in the applications, just as the CARA or CRRA utility functions. They are characterized by the following simple choice behavior.
De…nition 6 Suppose w; x; y; z are outcomes. We say that a BBR P is homogeneous if P (fxg; fw; xg) P (fyg; fy; zg) implies P (fxg; fx; fw; xgg) P (fyg; fy; fy; zgg).
The de…nition says that with a homogeneous BBR P , if x is chosen more frequently from fw; xg than y from fy; zg, then x should also be chosen more frequently over fw; xg than y over fy; zg. Proposition 3 below shows that such BBRs have the following representation.
De…nition 7 An RCR P is a Constant-Complexity-Averse (CCA) BBR if there exists a function V : D ! R ++ , > 0 and 2 R such that for any a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g,
, i = 1; : : : ; n and either
Hence, the value of a decision tree a is the -power mean of a's subtree values. The following result establishes that the homogeneity condition is equivalent to constant complexity aversion.
Proposition 3 A rich BBR P is homogeneous if and only if it is a CCA BBR.
When V; ; satisfy the equations above, we say that (V ; ; ) represents the CCA BBR P . We use the term CCA to describe such BBRs because their f functions are similar to the CRRA utility functions with domain R ++ . If we mimic the de…nition of relative risk aversion and apply it to the f function of a CCA BBR, we know that
Recall that f 2 is more concave than f 1 if and only if , if both f 1 and f 2 are twice di¤erentiable. Since v 2 R ++ , it is clear that if 1 2 , the RCR P 2 is more complexityaverse than P 1 . Thus, the CCA BBRs with the same V ; are ordered with respect to the parameter .
Error-Proneness
Under richness and Independence, an RCR is a Luce rule. Therefore, facing a binary choice problem fa; bg 2 D, if a decision maker chooses a with lower probability than b, then we know that V (b) V (a) and hence b a. When comparing two decision makers, 1 and 2, who both prefer b over a, if decision maker 2 always chooses a with higher probability, then we say that decision maker 2 is more error-prone. Formally, we de…ne it as follows.
De…nition 8
The RCR P 2 is more error-prone than P 1 if there exists a function h : (0;
, and P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = h(P 2 (fag; fa; bg)) (6) for 8fa; bg 2 D with P 2 (fag; fa; bg)
The equation (6) together with h( Theorem 3 Suppose the RCRs P 1 and P 2 are rich BBRs. Then, P 2 is more error-prone than P 1 if and only if there exist (V ; 1 ; f ) and (V ; 2 ; f ) that represent P 1 and P 2 respectively such that 1 2 .
Clearly, a smaller corresponds to more error-prone choice behavior. As for necessity, suppose there are four subtrees a; b; c; d such that P 2 (fag; fa; bg) = P 2 (fcg; fc; dg)
Say decision maker 2 is more error-prone than decision maker 1. Our de…nition of comparative error-proneness implies that P 1 (fag; fa; bg) P 2 (fag; fa; bg) and P 1 (fcg; fc; dg) P 2 (fcg; fc; dg). More importantly, it must also be true that P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = P 1 (fcg; fc; dg), because P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = h(P 2 (fag; fa; bg)) = h(P 2 (fcg; fc; dg)) = P 1 (fcg; fc; dg):
In other words, if decision maker 2 is more error-prone than decision maker 1, then P 2 (fag; fa; bg) = P 2 (fcg; fc; dg) implies P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = P 1 (fcg; fc; dg). This property yields a functional equation for which the exponential is the solution.
Limiting Cases of the BBR
By taking limits of the two measures we just derive, we can study limiting cases of the BBR.
Several limiting cases of the BBR are worth noting. First, …x some V (some value function de…ned only for outcomes). To illustrate, consider a collection of BBRs parametrized by two numbers, > 0 and : the CCA BBRs (V ; ; ). Consider a simple decision tree a = fx 2 ; fx 1 ; x 3 gg. For a CCA BBR (V ; ; ), we know that
The choice probability of fx 1 ; x 3 g when the decision tree is a is
When both and are arbitrarily large, the choice behavior of the BBR coincides with fully rational backward induction (with an equal-probability tie-breaking rule), because (7) implies that
and (9) implies that
These two equations are exactly what fully rational backward induction (with an equalprobability tie-breaking rule) requires.
Another useful limiting case can be derived by letting be …nite, while keeping arbitrarily large. In this limiting case, the decision maker never makes a mistake. She only chooses the subtrees with the highest value as in (10) . However, she may be averse to complex subtrees deterministically. For instance, suppose V (x i ) = i and = 1. Then, equation (7) becomes
Hence, facing a, this decision maker chooses the safe bet x 2 with certainty, despite that had she chosen fx 1 ; x 3 g, she would have ended with the best outcome x 3 . In other words, had
she not shied away from the complex subtree, she would have been better o¤.
In this limiting case, we can see clearly that complexity aversion is not about the size of decision trees. Suppose the decision problem is fx 2 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg instead. For any , the decision maker will choose fx 2 ; x 3 g with certainty because any single outcome in fx 2 ; x 3 g is at least as good as x 2 . By Stochastic Set Betweenness, fx 2 ; x 3 g x 2 . Hence, although our decision maker chooses suboptimally, she is not completely irrational.
Applying the BBR to Decision Trees
We apply the BBR to several simple examples in this section. Before stating the examples, let us note that so far, given a decision tree a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g, our model predicts the probability with which the decision maker chooses each subtree a i . It has not predicted how she will continue to choose after choosing some non-outcome subtree a j . Thus, we have presented a theory that relates a decision maker's choice at the …rst stage of a decision tree to how she would have chosen had she been asked to make choices in each of its subtrees. We have not addressed the decision maker's choices after the …rst stage of a decision tree.
A simple way to extend our model to the subsequent-stage choices is to impose history independence. Suppose b = fb 1 ; : : : ; b n g and b 1 = fa 1 ; : : : ; a m g. Under history independence, the probability that a i is chosen from b through b 1 is
In general, conditional on choosing b 1 from b, the probability of choosing a i from b 1 may also depend on b 2 ; : : : ; b n . By assuming history independence, only the chosen subtree b 1 matters.
History independence is a maintained hypothesis in the analysis throughout this section.
Below we brie ‡y discuss a simple question and two simple examples. Our …rst question is: According to the BBR, when adding a subtree to a decision tree increases the value of the decision tree, despite that the size of the tree increases? This question is not only of theoretical interest, but also has practical relevance. For instance, in the marketing literature, researchers …nd that excluding some less appealing products from a store's assortment often boosts the sales (see Broniarczyk, et al. (1998) , Simonson (1999) , and Boatwright and Nunes To answer the question, let us begin with a simpler example. Suppose a decision maker is facing a set of outcomes a = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g. A principal is considering whether or not to add another outcome x n+1 to a. In this example, adding x n+1 has two e¤ects to the value of a. Note that V (a) = f
f (V (x n+1 )) to the argument of f 1 , but also reduces the weight of each x i from 1=n to 1=(n + 1). Simple
In terms of axioms, this observations follows from Stochastic Set Betweenness and Dominance.
Therefore, in general, suppose we have a depth-k decision tree a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g 2 D k D such that a i = fa i;1 ; : : : ; a i;n i g, a i;j = fa i;j;1 ; : : : ; a i;j;n i;j g, and so on. Under this notation, a i is at most depth-(k 1), a i;j is at most depth-(k 2), and so on. Suppose the principal is considering whether or not to attach a subtree b to the tree a i 1 ;:::;i j of a by replacing a i 1 ;:::;i j with a i 1 ;:::;i j [ fbg. Here a i 1 ;:::;i j needs to be a non-outcome subtree (a i 1 ;:::;i j 2 D). Otherwise, a i 1 ;:::;i j [ fbg does not make sense.
From the previous example, we immediately know that attaching b to a i 1 ;:::;i j increases the value of a i 1 ;:::;i j if and only if V (b) V (a i 1 ;:::;i j ). By Dominance and an induction argument, it can be shown that the value of a increases if and only if the value of a i 1 ;:::;i j increases.
Thus, we have the following proposition whose proof is omitted. Intuitively, the result says that if a subtree is good enough, then adding it to a decision tree increases the tree's value. This observation is consistent with the empirical and experimental evidence we mention above.
To illustrate how the BBR may be used as a uni…ed framework to understand the e¤ective-ness of some popular presentation strategies, we present two examples. First, suppose there are three outcomes, x 1 ; : : : ; x 3 . By presenting them in a dynamic way such as fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg, x 1 is singled out from the others and hence emphasized. Intuitively, fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg increases the choice probability of x 1 , compared to presenting fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g. This is indeed the case. Whenever P is a BBR, P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg) > P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g).
The reason is simple. By Stochastic Set Betweenness, V (fx 2 ; x 3 g) maxfV (x 2 ); V (x 3 )g. Say
Therefore, P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg) > P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g).
In practice, when a set of options are presented, we often observe that some of the options is emphasized in a similar fashion. In policy design, the default option can be understood as being emphasized (see Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) , Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Kahneman, et al. (1991) , and Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) ). In other words, in the decision tree fx 1 ; fx 2 ; x 3 gg if the decision maker dislikes the default option x 1 , she moves on to choose between x 2 and x 3 . Similarly, in supermarkets, some products are emphasized because they are presented at more salient places, while many others are presented on shelves in a standard way. Thus, the BBR is consistent with these observations.
Of course, there are other theories that can explain these observations. However, we do not need a new theory or framework to analyze the following di¤erent presentation strategy, if we use the BBR. Again, suppose there are three outcomes x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 . By presenting them using the decision tree a = ffx 1 ; x 2 g; fx 1 ; x 3 gg, x 1 appears multiple times in the decision tree and hence repeated. Intuitively, a should also increase the choice probability of x 1 , compared to presenting fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g. This is true as well, whenever P is a BBR. The probability that x 1 is chosen in a is equal to p = P (ffx 1 ; x 2 gg; a) P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 g) + P (ffx 1 ; x 3 gg; a) P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 3 g), under the assumption of history independence. To see why p > P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g), simply note that p is a weighted average of P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 g) and P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 3 g). Since P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 g); P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 3 g) > P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g), we know that p > P (fx 1 g; fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g).
In practice, repeating an option is also common. For instance, an advertised website on Google's search results recurs at multiple pages (often up to 10 pages). Such design increases the probability of clicking the advertised website. In supermarkets, some snacks are presented not only on the shelf, but also right next to the checkout counter. Such assortment presentation strategy increases the chance that the decision makers buy the snacks. Thus, the BBR is also consistent with these observations.
Concluding Remarks
In dynamic problems, we usually use fully rational backward induction to describe a decision maker's choice behavior. By using fully rational backward induction, we implicitly assume that the decision maker is able to identify the optimal choice path and follow it when choosing. However, empirical and experimental research often …nds that decision makers'foresight is imperfect, and their choice behavior appears random to us, the modelers.
We propose several simple behavioral axioms, from which we derive a boundedly rational backward induction model, the BBR. A decision maker whose choice behavior follows some BBR chooses as if she (i) evaluates a decision tree by aggregating all its subtree values (instead of using the maximum), and (ii) makes random mistakes when choosing. As a result, the decision maker is likely to avoid a complex subtree even if it contains the best outcome.
Based on the model, we identify comparative measures of complexity aversion and errorproneness to compare di¤erent decision makers' behavior. In particular, we …nd that the concavity of f in (4) characterizes the decision maker's complexity aversion, the same way that the concavity of a vNM utility function characterizes a decision maker's risk aversion, and a constant measures the propensity that the decision maker makes mistakes. As complexity aversion and error-proneness disappear, our model converges to fully rational backward induction in the limit. 
It is not di¢ cult to see that
it can be shown that
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we show su¢ ciency. Suppose (D 0 ; P ) is rich and P is a BBR. According to (3), the RCR P is a Luce rule. Therefore, we know that (i) V ( implies Independence (see Luce (1959) and McFadden (1974) for the de…nition of the IIA condition).
Dominance is satis…ed because f is strictly increasing. To see why Continuity is satis…ed, note that a low (a; b) is equivalent to that V (a) and V (b) are close, as P is a Luce rule. 
, and Stochastic Set Betweenness is satis…ed. Consistency is
For a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g such that x 2 a 1 na 2 , y 2 a 2 na 1 , x y, and ja 1 j ja 2 j, let
Therefore, Preference for Accentuating Swaps is satis…ed.
Next, we prove necessity. When (D 0 ; P ) is rich and P satis…es Independence, P must be a Luce rule (see Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014)); that is, there exists a function V : D ! R ++ that assigns each decision subtree a 2 D a Luce value V (a) > 0, and for a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g,
Implicitly in the above equation, we set = 1. It is easy to see that a b implies V (a)
Take any x 2 D 0 , and suppose V (x) = v. We …rst prove that V (D 0 ) = R ++ . For any v 0 2 R ++ , we can …nd an y 2 D 0 such that V (y) = v 0 , because by richness, we can …nd y 2 D 0 such that P (fyg; fx; yg) = v v+v 0 . Then, we know that V (y) = v. By richness, we also know that for any v and any given …nite set a D 0 , we can …nd z 2 D 0 such that V (z) = v and z 6 2 a.
Due to Stochastic Set Betweenness, for any a 2
Furthermore, by richness, for any v 2 R ++ , we can …nd x 6 = y such that V (x) = V (y) = v.
Thus, fx; yg 2 D 1 and V (fx; yg) = v. Hence, V (D 1 ) = R ++ . We can do this for all D k , and …nd that V (D) = R ++ .
A standard induction argument shows that P satis…es Dominance only if the following statement holds. For a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g and b = fb 1 ; : : : ; b n g such that a i b i , a b, and if any of the former is strict, so is the latter. Let us call this statement Dominance .
Next, we show that for all a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g 2 D, by Dominance, there is a sequence of symmetric and strictly increasing function M n 's such that V (a) = M n (V (a 1 ); : : : ; V (a n )),
For any (v 1 ; : : : ; v n ) 2 R n ++ , we can …nd fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g such that V (x i ) = v i . It is guaranteed by richness that x i 's are distinct, even if v i = v j for some i; j. Now for any a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g such that V (a i ) = v i , it has to be true that V (a) = V (fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g), because we have
V (x i ) which by Dominance implies V (a) V (fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g), and the other way around. Therefore, we let M n map (v 1 ; : : : ; v n ) to V (fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g), which delivers a wellde…ned sequence of functions. Clearly M n is symmetric, meaning that M n (v 1 ; : : : ; v n ) = M n (v (1) ; : : : ; v (n) ) for any bijection : f1; : : : ng ! f1; : : : ; ng. Furthermore, the strictness in Dominance implies that M n is strictly increasing, and Consistency implies that M 1 (v) = v.
Notice that by Dominance, (a; b) = 0 if (a i ; b i ) = 0 for all i. It is then straightforward to translate Conintuity into the following statement. For 8" > 0, a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g, there exists a > 0 such that for all b = fb 1 ; : : :
We show in this paragraph that M n is continuous. Consider any " > 0 and (v 1 ; : : : ; v n ),
where V (a i ) = v i , a = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g. Now for
, we can …nd a 1 > 0 > 0 such that
Thus, now we know that if max jV
we know that M n is continuous.
Lemma 1 implies that for x i 2 D 0 , i = 1; : : : ; 4, where V (x i ) = v i , ffx 1 ; x 2 g; fx 3 ; x 4 gg ffx 1 ; x 3 g; fx 2 ; x 4 gg. Therefore, we know that
By Stochastic Set Betweenness, for any a;
In particular, we know that
This argument can be easily generalized to M n (v; : : : ; v) = v.
Consider n = 2. We have now shown the function M 2 is symmetric, strictly increasing, continuous, and satis…es (13) and (12) . According to Aczél (1948) , we know that there exist a stricly increasing continuous function f :
f (v 2 )). Thus, for any a = fa 1 ; a 2 g,
The idea of how to identify f for M 2 is described in Section 2. Since we also have M 1 (v) = v, and hence V (fag) = f 1 (f (V (a))), equation (4) is true for n = 1; 2.
To generalize (4) to the case with n > 2, we …rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For a i = fa i;1 ; : : : ; a i;m g, a = fa 1 ; : : : ; d n g with a i \ a j = ;, a S n i=1 a i . 
Proof of
Thus, we have
Proof of Proposition 2: For su¢ ciency, we only show that V (x) = 1 U (x) and Since f and g are strictly increasing, it must be true that V (a) = p 1 U (a) . By an induction argument, this observation can be extended to D.
For necessity, if (U ; ; g) also represents P , since the Luce value is unique up to a scalar multiplication,
for all a 2 D, and 1 > 0. By de…nition, this implies that V (x) = 1 U (x) .
As for f 's uniqueness, consider now x; y 2 D 0 . De…ne v 1 := V (x), v 2 := V (y), and decision trees according to (3) . For any x 2 D 0 , a = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g 2 D 1 , let v i := V (x i ).
Since f 2 = g f 1 ,
De…ne t i := f 1 (u i ). The inequality above becomes To show necessity, note that if P (fxg; a) = P (fyg; b), our condition implies that P (fxg; fx; ag) = P (fyg; fy; bg). Since
there exists a such that V (x) = V (y) and V (w) = V (z). Since By richness, the above arguments work for arbitrary , V (y) and V (z). Therefore, f must be homogeneous of degree 1, and take the form f (v) = v (see Wnuk (1984) ).
Proof of Theorem 3: First, we show su¢ ciency. For any fa; bg 2 D such that V 2 (a) V 2 (b), we can de…ne h(P 2 (fag; fa; bg)) to be P 1 (fag; fa; bg). It is clear that P 1 (fag; fa; bg) P 2 (fag; fa; bg), since 1 2 . Therefore, h(p) p for p 2 (0; 1 2 ]. When V 2 (a) = V 2 (b), we can think of it as V 2 (a) V 2 (b) and the other way around. Hence, h(1=2) = 1=2. The only thing we need to check is that h is well-de…ned; that is, for P 2 (fag; fa; bg) = P 2 (fcg; fc; dg),
we have P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = P 1 (fcg; fc; dg) as well. First note that since P 1 and P 2 share the same V and f , they share the same V . Then,
implies that V (a)=V (b) = V (c)=V (d) and hence
Thus, P 1 (fag; fa; bg) = P 1 (fcg; fc; dg).
Consider necessity. Suppose P i is represented by (V i ; i ; f i ). Since P 2 is an RCR, P 2 (fag; fa; bg) To satisfy the equation above, according to Aczél (1966, p. 144-145) , (v) = 1 v ; that is, V 1 (a) = 1 V 2 (a) for all a 2 D. Due to Proposition 2, we can pick a V 1 and 1 such that V 1 = V 2 := V . Of course, V := V 2 . Now P i is represented by (V ; i ; f i ). Since h(p) p, we know that 1 2 . Since we have picked V 1 such that V 1 = V 2 , it must be true that
